Single-peaked preferences have played an important role in the literature ever since they were used by Black (1948) to formulate a domain restriction that is sufficient for theexclusion of cycles according to the majority rule. In this paper, we approach single-peakedness from a choice-theoretic...

A population''s level of terrorism depends on two factors: people''s preferences (would they like creating damage?) and the constraints under which people act (what damage could they create, and at what punishment?). Cause-related policies, e.g. improving social stability or education, aim at...

We consider several notions of setwise stability for many-to-many matching markets with contracts and provide an analysis of the relations between the resulting stable sets and pairwise stable sets for general, substitutable, and strongly substitutable preferences. Apart from obtaining “set...

Coherent measures of risk defined by the axioms of monotonicity, subadditivity, positive homogeneity, and translation invariance are recent tools in risk management to assess the amount of risk agents are exposed to. If they also satisfy law invariance and comonotonic additivity, then we get a...

This paper reports on a laboratory experiment which investigates the impact of institutions and institutional choice in constant-sum sender-receiver games. We compare individual sender and receiver behavior in two different institutions: A sanction-free institution which is given by the bare...

We introduce a new method of varying risk that bidders face in first-price and second-price private value auctions. We find that decreasing bidders’ risk in first-price auction reduces the degree of overbidding relative to the risk-neutral Bayesian Nash equilibrium prediction.This finding is...

We experimentally study the influence of local information conditions on elite capture and social exclusion in community-based development schemes with heterogeneous groups. Not only information on the distribution of aid resources through community-based schemes, but also information on who...

In this paper we show experimentally that in a sequential auction the presence of synergies leads to more overbidding which in turn may result in bankruptcies. In line with theoretical predictions we find that the seller benefits from the buyers’ synergies. In contrast to theory the buyers...

We study procurement auctions held in sequential and simultaneous formats. For thelatter format, we find less bid participation and more aggressive bidding for projects withstrong common value components and more competition for projects having strong privatevalue components.

We consider multiple-type housing markets. To capture the dynamic aspect of trade in such markets, we study a dynamic recontracting process similar to the one introduced by Serrano and Volij (2005). First, we analyze the set of recurrent classes of this process as a (non-empty) solution concept....