This paper studies monitoring and punishment behavior by second and third parties in a cooperation experiment with … monitoring and punishment respond to changes in monitoring costs, and exploit the evidence to gain new insights about … to increasingly weaker incentives for cooperation relative to second party punishment as monitoring costs rise. In …

cooperation and efficiency in a social dilemma change in response to varying how monitoring and punishment are jointly organized … hypothesized, we find that delegated punishment outperforms other punishment regimes, irrespective of the monitoring regime, both … to the baseline unless accompanied by a credible punishment. When combined with a punishment institution, both monitoring …

Recent experiments show that public goods can be provided at high levels when mutual monitoring and costly punishment … are allowed. All these experiments, however, study monitoring and punishment in a setting where all agents can monitor and …

This paper studies monitoring and punishment behavior by second and third parties in a cooperation experiment with … monitoring and punishment respond to changes in monitoring costs, and exploit the evidence to gain new insights about … to increasingly weaker incentives for cooperation relative to second party punishment as monitoring costs rise. In …

Monitoring by peers is often an effective means of attenuating incentive problems. Most explanations of the efficacy of … mutual monitoring rely either on small group size or on a version of the Folk theorem with repeated interactions which … in which the effectiveness of mutual monitoring depends not on these factors, but rather on strong reciprocity: the …

This paper studies monitoring and punishment behavior by second and third parties in a cooperation experiment with … monitoring and punishment respond to changes in monitoring costs, and exploit the evidence to gain new insights about … to increasingly weaker incentives for cooperation relative to second party punishment as monitoring costs rise. In …