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Tournaments with gaps
Imhof, Lorens; Kräkel, Matthias - 2013
A standard tournament contract specifies only tournament prizes. If agents' performance is measured on a cardinal scale …, the principal can complement the tournament contract by a gap which defines the minimum distance by which the best … performing agent must beat the second best to receive the winner prize. We analyze a tournament with two risk averse agents …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198511
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Tournaments with Gaps
Imhof, Lorens; Kräkel, Matthias - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013
A standard tournament contract specifies only tournament prizes. If agents’ performance is measured on a cardinal … scale, the principal can complement the tournament contract by a gap which defines the minimum distance by which the best … performing agent must beat the second best to receive the winner prize. We analyze a tournament with two risk averse agents …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011140989
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Limited liability and the risk-incentive relationship
Budde, Jörg; Kräkel, Matthias - 2008
Several empirical findings have challenged the traditional view on the trade-off between risk and incentives. By combining risk aversion and limited liability in a standard principal-agent model the empirical puzzle on the positive relationship between risk and incentives can be explained....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383018
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Peer effects and incentives
Kräkel, Matthias - 2014
In a multi-agent setting, individuals often compare own performance with that of their peers. These comparisons influence agents incentives and lead to a noncooperative game, even if the agents have to complete independent tasks. I show that depending on the interplay of the peer effects, agents...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011430294
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Optimal delegated search with adverse selection and moral hazard
Ulbricht, Robert - 2014
The paper studies a model of delegated search. The distribution of search revenues is unknown to the principal and has to be elicited from the agent in order to design the optimal search policy. At the same time, the search process is unobservable, requiring search to be self-enforcing. The two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010358239
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Optimal delegated search with adverse selection and moral hazard
Ulbricht, Robert - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 1, pp. 253-278
The paper studies a model of delegated search. The distribution of search revenues is unknown to the principal and has to be elicited from the agent in order to design the optimal search policy. At the same time, the search process is unobservable, requiring search to be self-enforcing. The two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011672191
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Optimal delegated search with adverse selection and moral hazard
Ulbricht, Robert - In: Theoretical Economics 11 (2016) 1, pp. 253-278
The paper studies a model of delegated search. The distribution of search revenues is unknown to the principal and has to be elicited from the agent in order to design the optimal search policy. At the same time, the search process is unobservable, requiring search to be self-enforcing. The two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599569
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Peer Effects and Incentives
Kräkel, Matthias - 2014
In a multi-agent setting, individuals often compare own performance with that of their peers. These comparisons influence agents' incentives and lead to a noncooperative game, even if the agents have to complete independent tasks. I show that depending on the interplay of the peer effects,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011434941
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Optimal Delegated Search with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
Ulbricht, Robert - 2014
The paper studies a model of delegated search. The distribution of search revenues is unknown to the principal and has to be elicited from the agent in order to design the optimal search policy. At the same time, the search process is unobservable, requiring search to be self-enforcing. The two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010427161
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Rotten Kids With Bad Intentions
Netzer, Nick; Schmutzler, Armin - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2009
We examine a “Rotten Kid” model (Becker 1974) where a player with social preferences interacts with an egoistic player. We assume that social preferences are intentionbased rather than outcome-based. In a very general multi-stage setting we show that any equilibrium must involve mutually...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008545923