Showing 1 - 10 of 442
experimental literature we find evidence that tipping is motivated by reciprocity, but also by reputation concerns among frequent … users with an established reputation for non-tipping tend to get low effort answers. In addition, we analyse how tipping is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266676
is a noisy indicator of the firm's investment. We focus on dynamic reputation equilibria, whereby consumers "discipline …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385306
experimental literature we find evidence that tipping is motivated by reciprocity, but also by reputation concerns among frequent …, while users with an established reputation for non-tipping tend to get low effort answers. In addition, we analyse how …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005012075
is a noisy indicator of the firm’s investment. We focus on dynamic reputation equilibria, whereby consumers ‘discipline …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005020643
reputation concerns. Moreover, researchers appear to adjust their effort based on the user's previous tipping behaviour. We … reciprocity when people are socially minded, but also generally by strategic behaviour to build up a good reputation. Efficiency …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005135226
This paper revisits the normative properties of search-matching economies when homogeneous workers have concave utility functions and wages are bargained over. The optimal allocation of resources is characterized first when information is perfect and second when search effort is not observable....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276945
This study models producer protection legislation that would grant growers the right to claim damages (PPLD) if their contracts are prematurely terminated. In the absence of contracting frictions that prevent contractors from redesigning contracts to accommodate exogenous policy changes, PPLD...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277255
Incentives often fail in inducing economic agents to engage in a desirable activity; implementability is restricted. What restricts implementability? When does re-organization help to overcome this restriction? This paper shows that any restriction of implementability is caused by an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010278365
As credit and insurance markets are imperfect, and given that intra-family transfers, and the way a child uses her time outside school hours, are private information, the second-best policy makes school enrollment compulsory, forces overt child labour below its efficient level (if positive), and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010278558
We characterize a firm's profit-maximizing turnover policy in an environment where managerial productivity changes stochastically over time and is the managers' private information. Our key positive result shows that the productivity level that the firm requires for retention declines with the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282881