The theoretical aspects of three generation of financial crisis’ models are analyzed. On the basis of retrospective analysis of these models are determined the main causes than make the economic misbalance more profound and than cause a crisis. Проаналізовано теоретичні...

We analyze the effect of a bankruptcy law according to which some of the borrower’s assets are exempt from liquidation in the event of default in the context of a competitive credit market characterized either by moral hazard (MH) or by adverse selection (AS). In particular, we study how the...

(VF)Afin de comprendre pourquoi une banque décide la mise en faillite ou au contraire le soutien de son client en défaut de paiement, nous proposons une relecture de modèles issus de champs théoriques distincts. La littérature consacrée à la résolution des crises financières montre que...

This paper reinforces the argument of Harding and Sirmans (2002) that the observed preference of lenders for extended maturity rather than renegotiation of the principle in the case of loan default is due to the superior incentive properties of the former. Specifically, borrowers have a greater...

The paper presents an analysis of the main ethical aspects concerning the Romanian real estate intermediation sector. The analysis tries to evaluate the true utility of real estate agents’ services and to assess the potential negative effects of an unethical behavior for the clients. In...

In this paper, we extend the state-contingent production approach to principal-agent problems to the case where the state space is an atomless continuum. The approach is modelled on the treatment of optimal tax problems. The central observation is that, under reasonable conditions, the optimal...

Contracts adopted with later renegotiation in mind may take simple forms. In a principal-agent model, if renegotiation may occur after the agent chooses efforet, the principal protects against unfavorable renegotiation by "selling the project" to the agent via a sales contract. If only singleton...

We consider a start-up firm which applies for a bank loan to implement a project based on complementarity activities. The firm has the possibility to improve the complementarity effect by coordinating the activities. Coordination is costly and can be made either by using internal human resources...

Contracts adopted with later renegotiation in mind may take simple forms. In a principal-agent model, if renegotiation may occur after the agent chooses efforet, the principal protects against unfavorable renegotiation by "selling the project" to the agent via a sales contract. If only singleton...

Sales contracts emerge when a principal and an agent in amoral hazard environment cannot prevent themselves from renegotiating their contract. The renegotiation occurs after the agent chooses his unobservable effort, but before its consequences are realized. Unlike previous analyses, a contract...