This paper considers an exchange economy under uncertainty with asymmetric information. Uncertainty is represented by multiple priors and posteriors of agents who have either Bewley's incomplete preferences or Gilboa-Schmeidler's maximin expected utility preferences. The main results...

We consider an exchange economy under uncertainty, in which agents' utility functions exhibit constant absolute risk aversion, but they may be recursive and the expected utility calculation may be based on multiple subjective beliefs. The risk aversion coefficients, subjective beliefs,...

We present a model of incomplete information games with sets of priors. Upon arrival of private information, each player "updates" by the Bayes rule each of priors in this set to construct the set of posteriors consistent with the arrived piece of information. Then the player uses a possibly...

This paper considers a two agent model of trade with multiple priors. First, we characterize the existence of an agreeable bet on some event in terms of the set of priors. It is then shown that the existence of an agreeable bet on some event is a strictly stronger condition than the existence of...