We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when a buyer may present evidence relevant to her value … mechanism to be deterministic--hence akin to classic third degree price discrimination--independently of non-evidence … characteristics. We also find another sufficient condition depending on both evidence and valuations, whose content is that evidence …

We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when the buyer may present evidence relevant to the buyer … seller, the buyer presents evidence to support his previous assertions, and then the seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer … incentives for the seller to behave as required. We thereby provide a natural procedure whereby the seller can optimally price …

We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when a buyer may present evidence relevant to her value … mechanism to be deterministic--hence akin to classic third degree price discrimination--independently of non-evidence … characteristics. We also find another sufficient condition depending on both evidence and valuations, whose content is that evidence …

We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when the buyer may present evidence relevant to the buyer … seller, the buyer presents evidence to support his previous assertions, and then the seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer … incentives for the seller to behave as required. We thereby provide a natural procedure whereby the seller can optimally price …

We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when a buyer may present evidence relevant to her value … mechanism to be deterministic--hence akin to classic third degree price discrimination--independently of non-evidence … characteristics. We also find another sufficient condition depending on both evidence and valuations, whose content is that evidence …