Every finite noncooperative game can be presented as a weighted network congestion game, and also as a network congestion game with player-specific costs. In the first presentation, different players may contribute differently to congestion, and in the second, they are differently (negatively)...

Different kinds of networks, such as transportation, communication, computer, and supply networks, are susceptible to similar kinds of inefficiencies. These arise when congestion externalities make each user-s cost depend on the other users, choices of routes. If each user chooses the least...

Equilibrium flow in a physical network with a large number of users (e.g., transportation, communication, and computer networks) may not be unique if the costs of the network elements are not the same for all uses. Such differences among users may arise if they are not equally affected by...

Equilibrium flow in a physical network with a large number of users (e.g., transportation, communication, and computer networks) may not be unique if the costs of the network elements are not the same for all uses. Such differences among users may arise if they are not equally affected by...

Different kinds of networks, such as transportation, communication, computer, and supply networks, are susceptible to similar kinds of inefficiencies. These arise when congestion externalities make each user-s cost depend on the other users, choices of routes. If each user chooses the least...

Every finite noncooperative game can be presented as a weighted network congestion game, and also as a network congestion game with player-specific costs. In the first presentation, different players may contribute differently to congestion, and in the second, they are differently (negatively)...