We develop a model of strategic networks that captures two distinctive features of interfirm collaboration: bilateral agreements and nonexclusive relationships. Our analysis highlights the relationship between market competition, firms' incentives to invest in R&D, and the architecture of...

This paper examines the small world hypothesis. The first part of the paper presents empirical evidence on the evolution of a particular world: the world of journal publishing economists during the period 1970-2000. We find that in the 1970's the world of economics was a collection of islands....

Abstract The aim of the special issue is to explore open problems at the frontier of the Economics of Social Networks. The papers in this special issue range across pure and applied theory and empirical investigations, and in this they reflect the richness of on-going research in the economics...

We develop a model of strategic networks that captures two distinctive features of interfirm collaboration: bilateral agreements and nonexclusive relationships. Our analysis highlights the relationship between market competition, firms' incentives to invest in R&D, and the architecture of...

This paper examines the small world hypothesis. The first part of the paper presents empirical evidence on the evolution of a particular world: the world of journal publishing economists during the period 1970-2000. We find that in the 1970's the world of economics was a collection of islands....

We study a setting in which individual players choose their partners as well as a mode of behavior in 2×2 anti-coordination games – games where a player’s best response is to choose an action unlike that of her partner. We characterize the equilibrium networks as well as study the effects...

We develop a model of strategic networks that captures two distinctive features of interfirm collaboration: bilateral agreements and nonexclusive relationships. Our analysis highlights the relationship between market competition, firms' incentives to invest in R&D, and the architecture of...

We consider a non-cooperative model of information networks where communication is costly and not fully reliable. We examine the nature of Nash networks and efficient networks.

In an oligopoly, prior to competing in the market, firms have an opportunity to form pair-wise collaborative links with other firms. These pair-wise links involve a commitment of resources and lead to lower costs of production of the collaborating firms. The collection of pair-wise links defines...

We develop a dynamic model to study the formation of communication networks. In this model, individuals periodically make decisions concerning the continuation of existing information links and the formation of new information links, with their cohorts. These decisions trade off the costs of...