The European Union (EU) is not de jure a federation, but after 50 years of institutional evolution it possesses attributes of a federal state. One can conclude that EU is “something between” federation and intergovernmental organization. If we measure “something between” by interval [0,...

Shapley-Shubik and Penrose-Banzhaf (absolute and relative) power measures and their interpretations are analysed. Both of them could be successfully derived as cooperative game values, and at the same time both of them can be interpreted as probabilities of some decisive position (pivot, swing)...

During last two decades we observe a boom of power indices literature related to constitutional analysis of European Union institutions and distribution of intrainstitutional and inter-institutional influence in the European Union decision making. Growing interest to power indices methodology...

Fair representation of voters in a committee representing different voters’ groups is being broadly discussed during last few years. Assuming we know what the fair representation is, there exists a problem of optimal quota: given a “fair” distribution of voting weights, how to set up...

Increasing number of studies is focusing attention to constitutional analysis of European Union institutions and distribution of intra-institutional and inter-institutional influence in the European Union decision making. Most of the studies are related to distribution of voting power in the EU...