Showing 1 - 10 of 226
hazard. To model the procurer's roblem, we extend a standard sequential screening model to endogenous information acquisition … with moral hazard. The optimal contract displays systematic distortions in information acquisition. Due to a rent effect …, adverse selection induces too much information acquisition to prevent cost overruns and too little information acquisition to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003935679
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008990033
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008990039
In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This delegation invites corruption. In this paper we propose a model of corruption, examine how corruption affects the auction game, how the anticipation of corruption affects bidding, and how it altogether changes the revenue ranking...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011397659
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011428212
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011280896
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011283773
Fragmentation of production into more and more complex supply chains is a prominent feature of globalisation. It implies that transaction costs as part of total costs of ownership carry a large weight in procurement decisions. An analysis of the various types of transaction costs is also...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011373829
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011305029
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011346415