This paper explores the problem of non-convex labor supply decisions in an economy with both private and public sector jobs. In contrast to Vasilev (2015a), the sectoral labor choice is made in a sequential manner. Still, the micro-founded representation obtained from explicit aggregation over...

This paper describes the lottery- and insurance-market equilibrium in an economy with non-convex private- and public-sector employment. In contrast to Vasilev (2015a, 2015b), the public-sector labor supply decision is a sequential one. This requires two separate insurance market to operate, one...

This note describes the lottery- and insurance-market equilibrium in an economy with both private and public sector employment and non-convex labor supply. In addition, when households are constrained to search for jobs only in a certain sector, the framework requires that there should be...

This paper explores the problem of non-convex labor supply decisions in an economy with both private and public sector jobs. To this end, Hansen (1985) and Rogerson's (1988) indivisible-hours framework is extended to an environment featuring a double discrete labor choice. The novelty of the...

Motivated by the highly-unionized public sectors, the high public shares in total em- ployment, and the public sector wage premia observed in Europe, this paper examines the importance of public sector unions for macroeconomic theory. The model gen- erates cyclical behavior in hours and wages...

This paper studies the wasteful effect of bureaucracy on the economy by addressing the link between rent-seeking behavior of government bureaucrats and the public sector wage bill, which is taken to represent the rent component. In particular, public officials are modeled as individuals...

This paper explores the problem of non-convex labor supply decisions in an economy with both private and public sector jobs. To this end, Hansen (1985) and Rogerson's (1988) indivisible-hours framework is extended to an environment featuring a double discrete labor choice. The novelty of the...

This paper studies the wasteful effect of bureaucracy on the economy by addressing the link between opportunistic behavior of government bureaucrats and the public sector wage bill. In particular, public officials are modeled as individuals competing for a larger share of those public funds. A...

Motivated by the highly-unionized public sectors, the high public shares in total employment, and the public-sector wage premia observed in Europe, this paper examines the importance of public-sector unions for macroeconomic theory. The model generates cyclical behavior in hours and wages that...