This paper discusses global public goods related to the world';s land resources, their current provision and likely future provision, their potential impacts on the world's poorest households, as well as prospects for using foreign assistance to enhance these outcomes. Specifically, the paper...

This paper discusses global public goods related to the world';s land resources, their current provision and likely future provision, their potential impacts on the world's poorest households, as well as prospects for using foreign assistance to enhance these outcomes. Specifically, the paper...

Natural ecosystems provide a variety of benefits to society, known as “ecosystem services.” Fundamental to the provision of ecosystem services in a region is its underlying biodiversity, i.e., the wealth and variety of plants, animals, and microorganisms. Because the benefits from ecosystem...

Blume, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro (1984) first showed that compensation for takings can lead to a moral hazard problem that results in overinvestment in land suitable for public use. To the contrary, this paper shows that the compensation rule is irrelevant regarding the level of investment...

In this paper we employ a choice experiment (conducted in Ukraine and Turkey) on the valuation of a marine restoration programme in the Black Sea, to examine whether the value of environmental goods is sensitive to the source of public financing. We contribute to the debate on the optimal...

This paper presents the results from a series of framed field experiments conducted in fishing communities off the Caribbean coast of Colombia. The goal is to investigate the relative effectiveness of exogenous regulatory pressure and pro-social emotions in promoting cooperative behavior in a...

We study two provisional fixed-prize mechanisms for funding public goods: an all-pay auction and a lottery. In our setting, the public good is provided only if the participants' contributions are greater than the fixed-prize value; otherwise contributions are refunded. We prove that in this...

A profit-maximizing auctioneer can provide a public good to a group of agents. Each group member has a private value for the good being provided to the group. We investigate an auction mechanism where the auctioneer provides the good to the group, only if the sum of their bids exceeds a reserve...

Previous experimental and empirical evidence has identified social preferences in the voluntary provision of public goods. A number of competing models of such preferences have been proposed. We provide evidence for one model of behavior in these games, reciprocity (or matching, or conditional...

A profit-maximizing auctioneer can provide a public good to at most one of a number of groups of agents. The groups may have non-empty intersections. Each group member has a private value for the good being provided to the group. We investigate an auction mechanism where the auctioneer provides...