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Feuds in the Laboratory? A Social Dilemma Experiment
Nikiforakis, Nikos; Engelmann, Dirk - Department of Economics, Faculty of Business and Economics - 2008
Punishing free riders might promote cooperation, but it can also lead to feuds. We use a public good game with … punishment opportunities to investigate whether the threat of feuds is e¢ ciency enhancing. Treatments di¤er with respect to … feuds. While the possibility of a feud a¤ects punishment and contribution patterns, total earnings are not signi?cantly di …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005574884
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The Economics of Altruistic Punishment and the Demise of Cooperation
Egas, Martijn; Riedl, Arno - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2005
Explaining the evolution and maintenance of cooperation among unrelated individuals is one of the fundamental problems in biology and the social sciences. Recent experimental evidence suggests that altruistic punishment is an important mechanism to maintain cooperation among humans. In this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822636
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Punishment and Counter-punishment in Public Goods Games: Can we still govern ourselves?
Nikiforakis, Nikos - Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London - 2004
Recent public goods experiments have shown that free riding can be curtailed through mutual monitoring and sanctioning between members of a group. However, often we can not allow for punishment and exclude the possibility of counter-punishment occurring. We design a public goods experiment,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051667
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The choice of institutions to solve cooperation problems: A survey of experimental research
Dannenberg, Astrid; Gallier, Carlo - 2019
A growing experimental literature studies the endogenous choice of institutions to solve cooperation problems arising in prisoners' dilemmas, public goods games, and common pool resource games. Participants in these experiments have the opportunity to influence the rules of the game before they...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012011030
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The choice of institutions to solve cooperation problems: A survey of experimental research
Dannenberg, Astrid; Gallier, Carlo - 2019
A growing experimental literature studies the endogenous choice of institutions to solve cooperation problems arising in prisoners' dilemmas, public goods games, and common pool resource games. Participants in these experiments have the opportunity to influence the rules of the game before they...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012111130
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The choice of institutions to solve cooperation problems : a survey of experimental research
Dannenberg, Astrid; Gallier, Carlo - 2019
A growing experimental literature studies the endogenous choice of institutions to solve cooperation problems arising in prisoners' dilemmas, public goods games, and common pool resource games. Participants in these experiments have the opportunity to influence the rules of the game before they...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010446
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The choice of institutions to solve cooperation problems : a survey of experimental research
Dannenberg, Astrid; Gallier, Carlo - 2019
A growing experimental literature studies the endogenous choice of institutions to solve cooperation problems arising in prisoners' dilemmas, public goods games, and common pool resource games. Participants in these experiments have the opportunity to influence the rules of the game before they...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010646
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The decentralization of punishments in experiments with public goods
Berná, Zuzana; Špalek, Jiøí - Ekonomicko - správní fakulta, Masarykova Univerzita - 2012
This paper deals with the effects of introducing adequate punishment opportunities in experiments with public goods. Decentralized punishment means that the contributing subjects have a possibility to sanction free riders without the intervention of an external authority. The very first...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010897750
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In broad daylight: Full information and higher-order punishment opportunities promote cooperation
Kameik, Kenju; Putterman, Louis - 2012
The expectation that non-cooperators will be punished can help to sustain cooperation, but there are competing claims about whether opportunities to engage in higher-order punishment (punishing punishment or failure to punish) help or undermine cooperation in social dilemmas. In a set of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284085
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Strategic vs Non-Strategic Motivations of Sanctioning
Vyrastekova, J.; Funaki, Y.; Takeuchi, A. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2008
We isolate strategic and non-strategic motivations of sanctioning in a repeated public goods game. In two experimental treatments, subjects play the public goods game with the possibility to sanction others. In the STANDARD sanctions treatment, each subject learns about the sanctions received in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090990