We investigate the effect of punishment in a trust game with endowment heterogeneity in which the investor may punish … the allocator at a cost. Our results indicate that the effect of the punishment crucially depends on the investor …’s capacity of punishment, that is measured in our experiment by the proportion of the allocator’s payoffs that the investor can …

that avoid these costs and whether other, more centralized, punishment systems are superior and will be preferred by the … people. Here, we show that efficient peer sanctioning without much need for costly punishment emerges quickly if we introduce … social norm of high cooperation. This norm appears to guide subjects' cooperation and punishment choices, including the …

that avoid these costs and whether other, more centralized, punishment systems are superior and will be preferred by the … people. Here, we show that efficient peer sanctioning without much need for costly punishment emerges quickly if we introduce … social norm of high cooperation. This norm appears to guide subjects’ cooperation and punishment choices, including the …

systems exist that avoid these costs and whether other, more centralized, punishment systems are superior and will be … preferred by the people. Here, we show that welfare-enhancing peer sanctioning without much need for costly punishment emerges …. The exogenous removal of the norm consensus opportunity reduces the efficiency of peer punishment and renders centralized …