Showing 1 - 10 of 16
In this paper, we provide an epistemic characterization of iterated admissibility (IA), i.e., iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. We show that rationality and common assumption of rationality (RCAR) in complete lexicographic type structures implies IA, and that there exist such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009360277
The finitely repeated Prisoners' Dilemma is a good illustration of the discrepancy between the strategic behaviour suggested by a game-theoretic analysis and the behaviour often observed among human players, where cooperation is maintained through most of the game. A game-theoretic reasoning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369384
We investigate the extension of backward-induction to von Neumann extensive games (where information sets have a synchronous structure) and provide an epistemic characterization of it. Extensions of the idea of backward-induction were proposed by Penta (2009) and later by Perea (2013), who also...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318840
The analysis of rational play in dynamic games is usually done within a static framework that specifies a player's initial beliefs as well as his disposition to revise those beliefs conditional on hypothetical states of information. We suggest a simpler approach, where the rationality of a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282076
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011285514
The finitely repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma is a good illustration of the discrepancy between the strategic behaviour suggested by a game-theoretic analysis and the behaviour often observed among human players, where cooperation is maintained through most of the game. A game-theoretic reasoning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009753714
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011406895
The analysis of rational play in dynamic games is usually done within a static framework that specifies a player's initial beliefs as well as his disposition to revise those beliefs conditional on hypothetical states of information. We suggest a simpler approach, where the rationality of a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010542267
The problem of finding sufficient conditions for backward induction in games of perfect information is analysed in a syntactic framework with subjunctive conditionals. The structure of the game is described by a logical formula. Two different rationality conditions are formulated, which are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407565
We investigate the extension of backward-induction to von Neumann extensive games (where information sets have a synchronous structure) and provide an epistemic characterization of it. Extensions of the idea of backward-induction were proposed by Penta (2009) and later by Perea (2013), who also...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010826370