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Il pensiero di Kenneth Boulding, economista irenico. Relazioni sociali tra scambio, dono e coercizione
Caruso, Raul - In: HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND POLICY VI (2009) 2, pp. 5-30
of elements which are commonly considered in the economic theories of institutions, social capital, reciprocity and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008504119
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Observable strategies, commitments, and contracts
Wärneryd, Karl Erik - 2014
We consider rules (strategies, commitments, contracts, or computer programs) that make behavior contingent on an opponent's rule. The set of perfectly observable rules is not well defined. Previous contributions avoid this problem by restricting the rules deemed admissible. We instead limit the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010437999
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Group reciprocity
Hugh-Jones, David; Leroch, Martin A. - 2010
in that person's group. Group reciprocity may be a key motivation behind intergroup conflict. We investigated group …People exhibit group reciprocity when they retaliate, not against the person who harmed them, but against somebody else … reciprocity in a laboratory experiment. After a group identity manipulation, subjects played a Prisoner's Dilemma with others from …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010286452
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Group Reciprocity
Hugh-Jones, David; Leroch, Martin A. - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
in that person's group. Group reciprocity may be a key motivation behind intergroup conflict. We investigated group …People exhibit group reciprocity when they retaliate, not against the person who harmed them, but against somebody else … reciprocity in a laboratory experiment. After a group identity manipulation, subjects played a Prisoner's Dilemma with others from …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008675291
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Rationalising ‘Irrational’ Support for Political Violence
Jennings, C. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2011
This paper provides a rationale for group support for political violence in situations where violence does not provide a material benefit. Rabin’s (1993) theory of fairness is adopted to demonstrate that although group violence may not be the equilibrium of a material game it may be a fairness...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009024888
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Observable Strategies, Commitments, and Contracts
Wärneryd, Karl - 2014
We consider rules (strategies, commitments, contracts, or computer programs) that make behavior contingent on an opponent's rule. The set of perfectly observable rules is not well defined. Previous contributions avoid this problem by restricting the rules deemed admissible. We instead limit the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010435790
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Observable Strategies, Commitments, and Contracts
Wärneryd, Karl - CESifo - 2014
We consider rules (strategies, commitments, contracts, or computer programs) that make behavior contingent on an opponent’s rule. The set of perfectly observable rules is not well defined. Previous contributions avoid this problem by restricting the rules deemed admissible. We instead limit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011086457
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Observable Strategies, Commitments, and Contracts
Wärneryd, Karl - Department of Economics, Handelshögskolan i Stockholm - 2014
We consider rules (strategies, commitments, contracts, or computer programs) that make behavior contingent on an opponent’s rule. The set of perfectly observable rules is not well defined. Previous contributions avoid this problem by restricting the rules deemed admissible. We instead limit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011074900
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Virtual vs. Standard Strike: An Experiment
Innocenti, Alessandro; Nicita, Antonio - Dipartimento di Politica Economica, Finanza e Sviluppo … - 2009
than virtual strike. It is unclear whether this behavior re?ects reciprocity or other forms of social preferences. However …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005017523
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Rationalising ‘'Irrational'' Support for Political Violence
Jennings, Colin - Economics Department, University of Strathclyde - 2012
This paper provides a rationale for group support for political violence when violence does not provide a material bene–fit. A theory of fairness is adopted to demonstrate that although group violence may not be the equilibrium of a material game it may be a fairness equilibrium in a game...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011160809