make a voluntary payment, a bonus, after observing advice quality. While the combination of competition and reputation …. Thus, our results suggest that a voluntary component can act as a substitute for either competition or reputation …

of privately known competence, who cares about his reputation, chooses the timing of the forecast regarding the outcome …. Further, any report hurts the forecaster’s reputation in the short run, with later reports incurring larger penalties. The … reputation of a silent forecaster, on the other hand, gradually improves over time. …

This paper analyses the market for professional (expert) services where the experts are motivated by reputational … characteristics can induce clients to choose between experts with different reputations. The paper shows that clients choices have an … important impact on the incentives of experts to provide a high quality service. In particular, sorting of clients affects …

his reputation for truthtelling, we show that the larger is the inequality, the less information can credibly be … ‚Cheap-talk’ verwendet, in dem angenommen wird, dass der Lobbyist Wert auf seine Reputation als aufrichtiger …

his reputation for truthtelling, we show that the larger is the inequality, the less information can credibly be … angenommen wird, dass der Lobbyist Wert auf seine Reputation als aufrichtiger Informationsvermittler legt. Dabei kann gezeigt …

his reputation for truth telling, we show that the larger the inequality, the less information can credibly be transmitted …

build up a reputation for producing little, so that the output price increases in the market, and this increases the auction …