We investigate the impact of self-organized reputation versus certification by an independent institution on demand for …

strong implications for the industrial organization of certification markets: 1) Honest certification requires high prices … that may even exceed the static monopoly price. 2) Honest certification exhibits economies of scale and constitutes a …

This paper provides primary evidence of whether certification via reputable underwriters is beneficial to investors in … the corporate bond market. We focus on the high-yield bond market, in which certification of issuer quality is most …-power hypothesis, and contradict the traditional certification hypothesis and underlying reputation mechanism. …

products. There are increasing calls for improved transparency and, with regard to organization and the rules of certification …

We investigate the impact of self-organized reputation versus certification by an independent institution on demand for …

strong implications for the industrial organization of certification markets: 1) Honest certification requires high prices … that may even exceed the static monopoly price. 2) Honest certification exhibits economies of scale and constitutes a …

This paper provides primary evidence of whether certification via reputable underwriters is beneficial to investors in … the corporate bond market. We focus on the high-yield bond market, in which certification of issuer quality is most …-power hypothesis, and contradict the traditional certification hypothesis and underlying reputation mechanism. …

certification process, rather than exploit their market power …