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Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? : an experiment on voluntary payments, competition, and reputation in markets for expert services
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2016
Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011530053
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Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? : an experiment on voluntary payments, competition, and reputation in markets for expert services
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2017
Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011697162
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Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? : experimental evidence from markets for expert services
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2018
make a voluntary payment, a bonus, after observing advice quality. While the combination of competition and reputation …. Thus, our results suggest that a voluntary component can act as a substitute for either competition or reputation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011881706
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Bayesian repeated games and reputations
Forges, Françoise; Salomon, Antoine - 2014
equilibria share some features with the ones of multi-sided reputation models. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010256693
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The forward-looking disclosures of corporate managers : theory and evidence
Gropp, Reint; Karapandža, Raša; Opferkuch, Julian - 2016
We consider an infinitely repeated game in which a privately informed, long-lived manager raises funds from short-lived investors in order to finance a project. The manager can signal project quality to investors by making a (possibly costly) forward-looking disclosure about her project's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011504350
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The forward-looking disclosures of corporate managers : theory and evidence
Gropp, Reint; Karapandža, Raša; Opferkuch, Julian - 2016
We consider an infinitely repeated game in which a privately informed, long-lived manager raises funds from short-lived investors in order to finance a project. The manager can signal project quality to investors by making a (possibly costly) forward-looking disclosure about her project's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011506852
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Trust and reputation under asymmetric information
Janas, Moritz; Oljemark, Emilia - 2020 - Version: September 10, 2020
We study the role of information about the multiplier in a finitely repeated investment game. A high multiplier increases the reputational incentives of a trustee, leading to more repayments. Our perfect Bayesian equilibrium analysis shows that if the trustee is privately informed about the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012422494
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Timing of predictions in dynamic cheap talk : experts vs. quacks
Smirnov, Aleksei; Starkov, Egor - 2019
of privately known competence, who cares about his reputation, chooses the timing of the forecast regarding the outcome …. Further, any report hurts the forecaster’s reputation in the short run, with later reports incurring larger penalties. The … reputation of a silent forecaster, on the other hand, gradually improves over time. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012123351
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Delegation and Interim Performance Evaluation
Schütte, Miriam; Wichardt, Philipp Christoph - 2013
This paper considers the effects of an interim performance evaluation on the decision of a principal to delegate authority to a potentially biased but better informed agent. Assuming the agents’ outside option to be determined by market beliefs about their type, interim evaluations (a) provide...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293918
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Bayesian Repeated Games and Reputations
Forges, Francoise; Salomon, Antoine - 2014
equilibria share some features with the ones of multi-sided reputation models. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010352382