risky labour-market outcomes, adverse selection, moral hazard and risk aversion. The model combines structured student loans … (redistribution). In separating optima, the talented types bear more risk than the less-talented ones; they arise only if the social …

risky labour-market outcomes, adverse selection, moral hazard and risk aversion. The model combines structured student loans … (redistribution). In separating optima, the talented types bear more risk than the less-talented ones; they arise only if the social …

risky labour-market outcomes, adverse selection, moral hazard and risk aversion. The model combines structured student loans … (redistribution). In separating optima, the talented types bear more risk than the less-talented ones; they arise only if the social …

in the actual contracts. We pursue a possible explanation for this anomaly in risk-aversion of the contractor. Using a … expectd revenue. However, in so doing she increases her risk exposure. If the contractor is risk-averse, she typically will … avoid a corner solution to this risk vs. expected return trade-off. …

achievement of “prudentially sound, incentive-compatible and risk sensitive capital requirements”. The paper also attempts to … raise the awareness that the operation of risk mitigants does not justify a reduction in the capital levels to be retained … by banks – since banks operating with risk mitigants could still be considered inefficient operators of their management …