We model natural disaster insurance in France. We explicitly take into account the main institutional features of the system, such as the uniform premium rate in both high and low risk regions and the existence of a state reinsurance company. Our model indicates that the institutional set-up is...

The paper studies property insurance in Britain. It emphasises the following points. In the case of terrorism insurance the government decided to provide cost free stop loss insurance, to prevent the market from breaking down. When the country was hit by subsidence damages, the premiums and...

It is widely recognized that "market failure" prevents efficient risk sharing in natural disaster insurance. As a consequence, many countries adopted institutional frameworks presenting public sector participation, often praised as public-private partnerships. We define risk selection as a...

The paper studies property insurance in Britain. It emphasises the following points. In the case of terrorism insurance the government decided to provide cost free stop loss insurance, to prevent the market from breaking down. When the country was hit by subsidence damages, the premiums and...

The paper studies property insurance in Britain. It emphasises the following points. In the case of terrorism insurance the government decided to provide cost free stop loss insurance, to prevent the market from breaking down. When the country was hit by subsidence damages, the premiums and...

It is widely recognized that “market failure” prevents efficient risk sharing in natural disaster insurance. As a consequence, many countries adopted institutional frameworks presenting public sector participation, often praised as public-private partnerships. We define risk selection as a...

We model natural disaster insurance in France. We explicitly take into account the main institutional features of the system, such as the uniform premium rate in both high and low risk regions and the existence of a state reinsurance company. Our model indicates that the institutional set-up is...

It is widely recognized that ?market failure? prevents efficient risk sharing in natural disaster insurance. As a consequence, many countries adopted institutional frameworks presenting public sector participation, often praised as public-private partnerships. We define risk selection as a...

We model natural disaster insurance in France. We explicitly take into account the main institutional features of the system, such as the uniform premium rate in both high and low risk regions and the existence of a state reinsurance company. Our model indicates that the institutional set-up is...