This paper shows that the inefficiency of fiscal decentralization in the presence of spillovers, a main tenet of the decentralization literature, is overturned in a particular transportation context. In a monocentric city where road (bridge) capacity is financed by budget-balancing user fees,...

We explore the properties of various types of public and private pricing on acongested road network with heterogeneous users and allowing for elasticdemand. Heterogeneity is represented by a continuum of values of time. Thenetwork consists of both serial and parallel links, which allows us to...

This paper studies the second-best problem where not all links of acongested transportation network can be tolled. The second-best taxrule for this problem is derived for general static networks, so thatthe solution presented is valid for any graph of the network, and forany set of tolling...

We explore the properties of various types of public and private pricing on acongested road network with heterogeneous users and allowing for elasticdemand. Heterogeneity is represented by a continuum of values of time. Thenetwork consists of both serial and parallel links, which allows us to...

This paper considers the second-best problem where not all links of a congested transportation networkcan be tolled. The paper builds on earlier work, in which the second-best tax rule for this problem wasderived for general static networks, so that the solution presented is valid for any graph...

This paper shows that the inefficiency of fiscal decentralization in the presence of spillovers, a main tenet of the decentralization literature, is overturned in a particular transportation context. In a monocentric city where road (bridge) capacity is financed by budget-balancing user fees,...