We construct a bilateral search model of the housing market in which agents differ in their flow rewards while searching. Buyers and sellers enter the market with high flow rewards, but move at a Poisson rate to a state with low flow rewards if they do not transact in the meantime. We...

The purpose of the paper is to study the effects of labor market policies on the equilibrium rate of growth in the Grossman-Helpman model. For that purpose, the version of the their model developed by Klette and Kortum to explain the distribution of firm size is extended to allow for both...

This paper introduces risk averse workers into a search and matching model and considers the quantitative performance of the model over the business cycle. Wages are determined by long term contracts between workers and firms, with firms providing insurance to workers against variation in labor...

This paper studies the long run effects of monetary policy in a micro-founded model with trading frictions and endogenous market segmentation. Agents must pay a fixed cost to participate in a centralized liquidity market. By endogenizing the participation decision, this model endogenizes the...

This paper studies the long-run effects of anticipated inflation on output and welfare within a search-theoretic framework. We allow money-holders to choose the intensities with which they search for trading partners, so the frequency of trades is endogenous. We consider the standard pricing...

In this paper I examine whether a society can improve welfare by imposing a legal restriction to forbid the use of nominal bonds as a means of payments for goods. To do so, I integrate a microfounded model of money with the framework of limited participation. While the asset market is Walrasian,...

In this paper we document that "frictional wage inequality" (i.e. due to pure luck in the matching process in the labor market) is large and that both the standard McCall search model and the simplest Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides matching model, reasonably calibrated, are strikingly unable to...

We consider an economy where trade is decentralized and agents have incomplete information with respect to the value of money. Agents' learning evolves from private experiences and we explore how the formation of prices interacts with learning. We show that multiple equilibria arise, and...