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Incentives vs. selection in promotion tournaments: Can a designer kill two birds with one stone?
Höchtl, Wolfgang; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Stracke, Rudi; … - 2011
: incentive provision and selection. Our theoretical analysis reveals a trade-off for the tournament designer between the two …, letting more heterogeneous participants compete early increases the accuracy in selection. Experimental evidence supports our …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010278311
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Other-Regarding Preferences and Performance Pay : An Experiment on Incentives and Sorting
Villeval, Marie-Claire; Eriksson, Tor - 2004
the selection and incentive effects of pay schemes are so far thin on the ground. In addition, these effects may be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261940
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Incentives for managers and inequality among workers: evidence from a firm level experiment
Bandiera, Oriana; Barankay, Iwan; Rasul, Imran - 2006
We present evidence from a firm level experiment in which we engineered an exogenous change in managerial compensation from fixed wages to performance pay based on the average productivity of lower-tier workers. Theory suggests that managerial incentives affect both the mean and dispersion of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267490
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Self-selection and the efficiency of tournaments
Eriksson, Tor; Teyssier, Sabrina; Villeval, Marie-Claire - 2006
is attributable both to its incentive effect and to its selection effect among employees (Lazear, 2000), it is important …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267611
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How creative are you? An experimental study on self-selection in a competitive incentive scheme for creative performance
Bradler, Christiane - 2015
. The existing evidence on the self-selection of agents is largely limited to job tasks where performance is driven by … productivity, but only according to their risk attitudes and self-assessments. The reason for the absence of a selection of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010500559
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How creative are you? : an experimental study on self-selection in a competitive incentive scheme for creative performance
Bradler, Christiane - 2015
. The existing evidence on the self-selection of agents is largely limited to job tasks where performance is driven by … productivity, but only according to their risk attitudes and self-assessments. The reason for the absence of a selection of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010498559
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How creative are you? An experimental study on self-selection in a competitive incentive scheme for creative performance
Bradler, Christiane - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) - 2015
. The existing evidence on the self-selection of agents is largely limited to job tasks where performance is driven by … productivity, but only according to their risk attitudes and self-assessments. The reason for the absence of a selection of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011213916
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Self-Selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments
Eriksson, Tor; Teyssier, Sabrina; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2006
is attributable both to its incentive effect and to its selection effect among employees (Lazear, 2000), it is important …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005086299
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The Peter Principle: An Experiment
Dickinson, David; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2007
The Peter Principle states that, after a promotion, the observed output of promoted employees tends to fall. Lazear (2004) models this principle as resulting from a regression to the mean of the transitory component of ability. Our experiment reproduces this model in the laboratory by means of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005112717
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Incentives for Managers and Inequality Among Workers: Evidence from a Firm Level Experiment
Bandiera, Oriana; Barankay, Iwan; Rasul, Imran - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006
We present evidence from a firm level experiment in which we engineered an exogenous change in managerial compensation from fixed wages to performance pay based on the average productivity of lower-tier workers. Theory suggests that managerial incentives affect both the mean and dispersion of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822207