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up. In this signaling game, proposing (or getting married) is costly but can indicate strong love. The striking property … sufficiently large, the signaling mechanism breaks down, and only a pooling equilibrium in which fewer couples get married remains …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011752304
up. In this signaling game, proposing (or getting married) is costly but can indicate strong love. The striking property … sufficiently large, the signaling mechanism breaks down, and only a pooling equilibrium in which fewer couples get married remains …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011758225
up. In this signaling game, proposing (or getting married) is costly but can indicate strong love. The striking property … sufficiently large, the signaling mechanism breaks down, and only a pooling equilibrium in which fewer couples get married remains …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011819323
up. In this signaling game, proposing (or getting married) is costly but can indicate strong love. The striking property … sufficiently large, the signaling mechanism breaks down, and only a pooling equilibrium in which fewer couples get married remains …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011819710
up. In this signaling game, proposing (or getting married) is costly but can indicate strong love. The striking property … sufficiently large, the signaling mechanism breaks down, and only a pooling equilibrium in which fewer couples get married remains …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011786969
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012267312
Using a laboratory experiment, we present first evidence that stigmatization through public exposure causally reduces the take-up of an individually beneficial transfer. Our design exogenously varies the informativeness of the take-up decision by varying whether transfer eligibility is based on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011663605
A puzzle of the modern welfare state is that a large fraction of social benefits is not taken up. Using a laboratory experiment, we present evidence that stigmatization through public exposure causally reduces the take-up of a redistributive transfer by 30 percentage points. We build a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011574103
Using a laboratory experiment, we present first evidence that social image concerns causally reduce the take-up of an individually beneficial transfer. Our design manipulates the informativeness of the take-up decision by varying whether transfer eligibility is based on ability or luck, and how...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011905224
Using a laboratory experiment, we present first evidence that social image concerns causally reduce the take -up of an individual ly beneficial transfer. Our design manipulates the informativeness of the take- up decision by varying whether transfer eligibility is based on ability or luck, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011884557