We analyze a two-attribute procurement auction that uses yardstick competition to settle prices. The submitted sealed bids are replaced by yardstick bids, computed by a linear weighting of the other participants’ bids. The auction simplifies the procurement process by reducing the...

We analyze a simple multi-attribute procurement auction that uses yardstick competition to settle prices. Upon receiving the submitted bids the auctioneer computes the yardstick prices (bids) by a linear weighting of the other participants’ bids. The auction simplifies the procurement process...

We suggest a market design for rapid demand response in electricity markets. The solution consists of remotely controlled switches, meters, forecasting models as well as a flexible auction market to set prices and select endusers job by job. The auction market motivates truth-telling and makes...

We consider efficiency measurement methods in the presence of uncertain input and output data, and without the (empirically problematic) assumption of convexity of the production technology. In particular, we perform a simulation study in order to contrast two well-established methods, IDEA and...

We consider efficiency measurement methods in the presence of uncertain input and output data, and without the (empirically problematic) assumption of convexity of the production technology. In particular, we perform a simulation study in order to contrast two well-established methods, IDEA and...