The objective of the paper is to analyze the formation of social networks where individuals are allowed to engage in several groups at the same time. These group structures are interpreted here as social networks. Each group is supposed to have specific rules or constitutions governing which...

We develop a theoretical framework that allows us to study which bilateral links and coalition structures are going to emerge at equilibrium. We define the notion of coalitional network to represent a network and a coalition structure, where the network specifies the nature of the relationship...

We propose a new concept, the pairwise farsightedly stable set, in order to predict which networks may be formed among farsighted players. A set of networks G is pairto a network outside G are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well wise farsightedly stable (i) if all possible...

We provide a tractable concept that can be used to study the influence of the degree of farsightedness on network stability. A set of networks GK is a level-K farsightedly stable set if three conditions are satisfied. First, external deviations should be deterred. Second, from any network...

A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any coalition structure p belonging to P to a coalition structure outside P are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) if there exists a farsighted improving path from any...

We use laboratory experiments to analyze decentralized decision-making in one-sided matching markets. We find that subjects tend to make decisions in line with theoretical models, as their offering and accepting decisions are only guided by the objective of improving upon the status quo....

We propose a concept to study the stability of social and economic networks when players are farsighted and allocations are determined endogenously. A set of networks is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining if there exists an allocation rule and a bargaining threat...

A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any coalition structure p belonging to P to a coalition structure outside P are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) if there exists a farsighted improvingpath from any...

A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any coalition structure p belonging to P to a coalition structure outside P are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) if there exists a farsighted improvingpath from any...