We study stochastic games with incomplete information on one side, where the transition is controlled by one of the players. <p> We prove that if the informed player also controls the transition, the game has a value, whereas if the uninformed player controls the transition, the max-min value, as...</p>

Quitting games are I-player sequential games in which, at any stage, each player has the choice between continuing and quitting. The game ends as soon as at least one player chooses to quit; player i then receives a payoff , which depends on the set S of players that did choose to quit. If the...

The general idea of the proof is to define a class of sets, the solvable sets, which can safely be thought of as absorbing states.

Presentation of somme recent results of stochastic games

We survey recent results on the existence of the value in zero-sum stopping games with discrete and continuous time, and on the existence of e-equilibria in non zero-sum games with discrete time.