We study stochastic games with incomplete information on one side, where the transition is controlled by one of the players. <p> We prove that if the informed player also controls the transition, the game has a value, whereas if the uninformed player controls the transition, the max-min value, as...</p>

We study the existence of uniform correlated equilibrium payoffs in stochastic games. The correlation devices that we use are either autonomous (they base their choice of signal on previous signals, but not on previous states or actions) or stationary (their choice is independent of any data and...

Quitting games are I-player sequential games in which, at any stage, each player has the choice between continuing and quitting. The game ends as soon as at least one player chooses to quit; player i then receives a payoff , which depends on the set S of players that did choose to quit. If the...

We survey recent results on the existence of the value in zero-sum stopping games with discrete and continuous time, and on the existence of e-equilibria in non zero-sum games with discrete time.

We introduce the dual of a stochastic game with incomplete information on one side, and we deduce some properties of optimal strategies of the uninformed player.

The general idea of the proof is to define a class of sets, the solvable sets, which can safely be thought of as absorbing states.

Presentation of somme recent results of stochastic games

We prove that, in every stochastic game with finitely many states and actions, there exists at least one state, starting from which an equilibrium payoff exists. This is achieved by proving that there exists a solvable set. This generalizes to an arbitrary number of players a result due to...