Auctions are the allocation-mechanisms of choice whenever goods and information in markets are scarce. Therefore, understanding how information affects welfare and revenues in these markets is of fundamental interest. We introduce new statistical concepts, k- and k-m-dispersion, for...

There are extensive studies on the allocation problems in the field of insurance and finance. We observe that these studies, although involving different methodologies, share some inherent commonalities. In this paper, we develop a new framework for these studies with the tool of arrangement...

A new approach to moral hazard is presented. Once local incentive compatibility is satisfied, the problem of verifying global incentive compatibility is shown to be isomorphic to the problem of comparing two classes of distribution functions. Thus, tools from choice under uncertainty can be...

A spectrum of upper bounds (Qα(X;p)) α∈[0,∞] on the (largest) (1-p)-quantile Q(X;p) of an arbitrary random variable X is introduced and shown to be stable and monotonic in α, p, and X , with Q0(X;p) = Q(X;p). If p is small enough and the distribution of X is regular enough, then Qα(X;p)...

Orderings of interdependence among random variables are useful in many economic contexts, for example, in assessing ex post inequality under uncertainty; in comparing multidimensional inequality; in valuing portfolios of assets or insurance policies; and in assessing systemic risk. We explore...

Auctions are the allocation-mechanisms of choice whenever goods and information in markets are scarce. Therefore, understanding how information affects welfare and revenues in these markets is of fundamental interest. We introduce new statistical concepts, k- and k-m-dispersion, for...

A spectrum of upper bounds (Qα(X ; p) ae[0,∞] on the (largest) (1-p)-quantile Q(X;p) of an arbitrary random variable X is introduced and shown to be stable and monotonic in α, p, and X , with Q0(X ;p) = Q(X;p). If p is small enough and the distribution of X is regular enough, then Qα(X ; p)...