Showing 1 - 10 of 16
In many situations, agents take risks by choosing an action that increases their performance immediately, but that potentially leads to a large loss. The current paper studies how such risk-taking behavior depends on the level of competition that the agents face. We study a tournament model and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013438608
Gender differences in overconfidence have been extensively documented in the empirical literature, but the implications for labor market outcomes are not well understood. In this paper, we analyze how men's relatively higher overconfidence, combined with competitive job incentives, affects...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014290249
We investigate the effect of employee heterogeneity on the incentive to put forth effort in a market-based tournament. Employers use the tournament's outcome to estimate employees' abilities and accordingly condition their wage offers. Employees put forth effort, because by doing so they...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010311042
In this paper, we analyze a principal's optimal feedback policy in tournaments. We close a gap in the literature by assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy at the beginning of the tournament. Our analysis shows that in equilibrium the principal reveals in-termediate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333966
We investigate the effect of employee heterogeneity on the incentive to put forth effort in a market-based tournament. Employers use the tournament's outcome to estimate employees' abilities and accordingly condition their wage offers. Employees put forth effort, because by doing so they...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010985510
Gender differences in overconfidence are well documented in the empirical literature, but their impact on labor market outcomes remains underexplored. We provide new insights into how behavioral biases interact with career dynamics by presenting a theoretical analysis of how men's relatively...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015165957
In this paper, we analyze a principal's optimal feedback policy in tournaments. We close a gap in the literature by assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy at the beginning of the tournament. Our analysis shows that in equilibrium the principal reveals in-termediate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785932
In this paper, we analyze a principal's optimal feedback policy in tournaments. We close a gap in the literature by assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy at the beginning of the tournament. Our analysis shows that in equilibrium the principal reveals intermediate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822892
Using a promotion signaling model in which wages are realistically shaped by market forces, we analyze how male overconfidence combined with competitive workplace incentives affects gender equality in the labor market. Our main result is that overconfident workers exert more effort to be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014374508
Using a promotion signaling model in which wages are realistically shaped by market forces, we analyze how male overconfidence combined with competitive workplace incentives affects gender equality in the labor market. Our main result is that overconfident workers exert more effort to be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014233644