The completeness axiom of choice has been questioned for long, and in response, theoretical models of decision making allowing for incomplete preferences have been developed. So far the theoretical accomplishments have however not been paired with empirical evidence on the actual existence of...

The probability triangle (also called the Marschak-Machina triangle) allows for compact and intuitive depictions of risk preferences. Here, we develop an analogous tool for choice under uncertainty - the ambiguity triangle - and show that indifference curves in this triangle capture preferences...

Economic theory suggests that the deterrence of deviant behavior is driven by a combination of severity and certainty of punishment. This paper presents the first controlled experiment to study a third important factor that has been mainly overlooked: the swiftness of formal sanctions. We...

This paper focuses on information acquisition and individual decision making in ambiguous situations and presents a novel experimental design which may help to tackle open questions from a fresh perspective. Instead of giving subjects the choice between risky and ambiguous Ellsberg urns, we let...

We implement an experiment to elicit subjects’ ambiguity attitudes in the spirit of Ellsberg’s three-color urn. The procedure includes three design elements that (together) have not been featured in similar experiments: Strict ambiguity preferences, a single decision, and a mechanical...

As illustrated by the famous Ellsberg paradox, many subjects prefer to bet on events with known rather than with unknown probabilities, i.e., they are ambiguity averse. In an experiment, we examine subjects’ choices when there is an additional source of ambiguity, namely, when they do not know...

This paper uses laboratory experiments to study subjects’ assessment of uncertainty resulting from strategic and non-strategic decisions of other players. Nonstrategic events are defined by the colors of balls drawn from urns, whereas strategic events are defined by the action choice in Stag...

In subjective expected utility (SEU) the decision weights people attach to events are their beliefs about the likelihood of events. Much empirical evidence, inspired by Ellsberg (1961) and others, shows that people prefer to bet on events they know more about, even when their beliefs are held...

The probability triangle (also called the Marschak-Machina triangle) allows for compact and intuitive depictions of risk preferences. Here, we develop an analogous tool for choice under uncertainty - the ambiguity triangle - and show that indifference curves in this triangle capture preferences...