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Ein Instrument zur Eindämmung von Moral Hazard in der Arbeitslosenversicherung ist die finanzielle Sanktion in Form … Vermittlungsvorschlägen und Sperrzeiten auf die Dauer der Arbeitslosigkeit und die Qualität der aufgenommenen Jobs.Wir schätzen Multi … auf die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer Krankmeldung. Dieser Effekt ist geringer in späteren Monaten der Arbeitslosigkeit. Dies …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011418245
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011449662
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex-ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011414725
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011635521
This study examines the determinants of job-finding rates of unemployment benefit recipientsunder the Chilean program. This is a unique, innovative program that combines socialinsurance through a solidarity fund (SF) with self-insurance in the form of unemploymentinsurance savings accounts...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009360606
We examine how a 16-week cut in potential unemployment insurance (UI) duration in Missouri affected search behavior of UI recipients and the aggregate labor market. Using a regression discontinuity design (RDD), we estimate a marginal effect of maximum duration on UI and nonemployment spells of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012233084
We provide new evidence on the effect of the unemployment insurance (UI) weekly benefit amount on unemployment insurance spells based on administrative data from the state of Missouri covering the period 2003-2013. Identification comes from a regression kink design that exploits the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012236713
In response to the Great Recession and sustained labor market downturn, the availability of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits was extended to historical highs in the United States. We exploit variation in the timing and size of UI benefit extensions across states to estimate the overall...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010319546
Ein Instrument zur Eindämmung von Moral Hazard in der Arbeitslosenversicherung ist die finanzielle Sanktion in Form … Vermittlungsvorschlägen und Sperrzeiten auf die Dauer der Arbeitslosigkeit und die Qualität der aufgenommenen Jobs.Wir schätzen Multi … auf die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer Krankmeldung. Dieser Effekt ist geringer in späteren Monaten der Arbeitslosigkeit. Dies …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011531724
Reduced form estimations of precautionary saving with respect to labor market risk have hitherto failed to consider that a decrease of say unemployment probability or an increase in unemployment insurance (UI) generosity affects saving not only by reducing the expected variance in earnings but...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009789000