We study stochastic games with incomplete information on one side, where the transition is controlled by one of the players. <p> We prove that if the informed player also controls the transition, the game has a value, whereas if the uninformed player controls the transition, the max-min value, as...</p>

We study zero-sum stochastic games in which players do not observe the actions of the opponent. Rather, they observe a stochastic signal that may depend on the state, and on the pair of actions chosen by the players. We assume each player observes the state and his own action. <p> We propose a...</p>

We survey recent results on the existence of the value in zero-sum stopping games with discrete and continuous time, and on the existence of e-equilibria in non zero-sum games with discrete time.

This paper finds that the market betas of value and small stocks have decreased by about 75% in the second half of the twentieth century. The decline in beta can be related to a long-term improvement in economic conditions that made these companies less risky.