Previous experiments on public goods dilemmas have found that the opportunity to punish leads to higher contributions and reduces the free rider problem; however, a substantial amount of punishment is targeted on high contributors. In the experiment reported here, subjects are given the...

The idea of this paper is that "intergenerational majority rule voting" can sometimes be both efficient and equitable, as formalised by an intergenerational application of the Arrow axioms. A decision by the US Environmental Protection Agency to require carbon filtration of drinking water on the...

The idea of this paper is that "intergenerational majority rule voting" can sometimes be both efficient and equitable, as formalised by an intergenerational application of the Arrow axioms. A decision by the US Environmental Protection Agency to require carbon filtration of drinking water on the...

The storable votes mechanism is a method of voting for committees that meet periodically to consider a series of binary decisions. Each member is allocated a fixed budget of votes to be cast as desired over the multiple decisions. Voters are induced to spend more votes on those decisions that...

This paper introduces a model where elections are games where voters have preferences over a public good (policy platforms) and a private good (transfers). The model produces the standard social choice results such as core convergence and policy separation. Furthermore, by introducing transfers,...

This paper proposes a framework for studying policy making in a federal system in the presence of spillover externalities. Local jurisdictions choose local policies by majority rule subject to standards that are set by majority rule at the federal level. We characterize the induced preferences...