In agency theory, offering a flat salary contract under unobservable effort creates a moral hazard problem because the agent is motivated to shirk and provide less than a previously agreed-upon level of effort. We examine a moral solution to this moral hazard problem. In particular, we present a...

Changes in the internal and the external environment of organizations are causing many of them to redesign individual jobs as team functions. Sales organizations, in particular, are responding to increased selling costs by redesigning the selling function to include a support person. The basic...

In this paper, we develop an analytical model of joint maximizing behavior on the part of students and professors to develop policy rules for universities who use student evaluations as tools for increasing professor effort and, thereby, student knowledge. More precisely, we examine the...

Our primary objective in this paper is to analyze a framework that simultaneously examines the role of monitoring and incentives in the design of sales force control systems. Previous research has focused exclusively on the role of incentives in directing salesforce effort. We build on the...