In many business transactions, labor-management relations, international conflicts, and welfare-state reforms, bargainers hold strong entitlements that are often generated by claims that are not feasible anymore. These entitlements seem to shape negotiation behavior considerably. By using the...

Using a unique experimental data set, we investigate how asymmetric legal rights shape bargainers' aspiration levels through moral entitlements derived from equity norms and number prominence. Aspiration formation is typically hard to observe in real life. Our study involves 15 negotiations from...

Using a unique experimental data set, we investigate how asymmetric legal rights shape bargainers’ aspiration levels through moral entitlements derived from equity norms and number prominence. Aspiration formation is typically hard to observe in real life. Our study involves 15 negotiations...

We report an experiment designed to study bargaining behavior between one buyer and multiple sellers with complementarity and how it is influenced by fairness concern and information transparency. We base our setup on a structured alternating-offer bargaining model in which a buyer procures...

The theory of negotiation belongs to several fields, but it has like starting point sociology and social psychology, more precise the segment which studies human behaviour in various social situations and the manner in which people want to be displayed comparing with the others. This paper...

This chapter surveys literature on experimental law and economics. Long the domain of legally minded psychologists and criminologists, experimental methods are gaining significant popularity among economists interested in exploring positive and normative aspects of law. Because this literature...

We compare dictator and impunity games. In impunity games, responders can reject offers but to no payoff consequence to proposers. Because proposers act under impunity, we should expect the same behavior across games, but experimentally observed behavior varies. Responders indeed exercise the...

In many bargaining situations, the distribution of seats or voting weights does not accurately reflect bargaining power. Maaser, Paetzel and Traub (Games and Economic Behavior, 2019) conducted an experiment to investigate the effect of such nominal power differences in the classic Baron-Ferejohn...

We experimentally investigate the effects of group size on behavior and outcomes in a multilateral bargaining game. Using a Baron–Ferejohn protocol, our main interest is in the extent of costly delay (number of bargaining rounds needed to reach agreement). We investigate the effects of group...

Tanulmányunkban az ultimátumjáték kísérleti eredményeinek értelmezésével foglalkozunk. Először a játékkal kapcsolatos irodalomban eddig felvetett magyarázatok kritikai vizsgálatát végezzük el. Majd kifejtjük, hogy miért érdemes komolyan venni a versengő indokok...