We study the decision of an established firm to commercialize innovations. An innovation can be exploited by the established firm as an internal venture, pursued by a new firm start-up as an external venture, or not commercialized at all. The limited commercialization capacity of the established...

This book examines the issue of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the context of technological development, and in particular the impact of M&As on the innovation process. In so doing, the book integrates two bodies of literature, on M&As, and on innovation studies, a nexus which the editors...

Why are contracts not fully indexed? In a setting in which fully indexed contracts are feasible, the authors find that, when price-level data are gathered with delay, these contracts are not renegotiation-proof. The contracts that replace them entail a lower level of welfare for the parties to...

Safer firms receive funding from reputable venture capitalists and offer new securities underwritten by reputable investment banks. We offer a new explanation for these facts employing a moral-hazard model in which a firm and an agent are matched endogenously. More reputable agent's effort has a...

Why do some start-up firms raise funds from banks and others from venture capitalists? To address this question, I study a model in which the venture capitalist can evaluate the entrepreneur's project more accurately than the bank but can also threaten to steal it from the entrepreneur....