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Multi-player Bargaining with Endogenous Capacity
Camera, Gabriele; Selcuk, Cemil - In: Review of Economic Dynamics 13 (2010) 3, pp. 637-653
We study equilibrium prices and trade volume in a market with several identical buyers and a seller who commits to an inventory and then offers goods sequentially. Prices are determined by a strategic costly bargaining process with a random sequence of proponents. A unique subgame perfect...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005009766
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Optimal value commitment in bilateral bargaining
Britz, Volker - In: Games and Economic Behavior 77 (2013) 1, pp. 345-351
We study the role of commitment as a source of strategic power in a non-cooperative bargaining game. Two impatient … recognition probabilities. Before bargaining, a player can commit to some part of the surplus. This commitment remains binding … something which has become impossible. The model offers insight on the relative importance of proposal power and commitment for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010603330
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On bargaining partner selection when communication is restricted
Calvó-Armengol, Antoni - In: International Journal of Game Theory 30 (2002) 4, pp. 503-515
This paper analyzes the optimal selection of a bargaining partner when communication among players is restricted by an exogenously given graph. If players are equally patient, bargaining agreements are immune to players' locations, and the selection of a bargaining partner is not an issue. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005598473
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On the convergence to the Nash bargaining solution for action-dependent bargaining protocols
Britz, Volker; Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 86 (2014) C, pp. 178-183
We consider a non-cooperative multilateral bargaining game and study an action-dependent bargaining protocol, that is, the probability with which a player becomes the proposer in a round of bargaining depends on the identity of the player who previously rejected. An important example is the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010785188
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Negotiations Over Intellectual Property Protection: A Strategic Bargaining Aspect
Tsai, Ying-Yi; Brkic, Luka; McPhail, Edward - In: Zagreb International Review of Economics and Business 7 (2004) 2, pp. 1-25
This paper provides a bargaining aspect into the analysis of intellectual property protection across borders. We investigate the conditions under which a mutually accepted level of intellectual property enforcement can be agreed upon between two negotiating governments. We also explore the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005698456
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Delays and partial agreements in multi-issue bargaining
Acharya, Avidit; Ortner, Juan - In: Journal of Economic Theory 148 (2013) 5, pp. 2150-2163
We model a situation in which two players bargain over two pies, one of which can only be consumed starting at a future date. Suppose the players value the pies asymmetrically: one player values the existing pie more than the future one, while the other player has the opposite valuation. We show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010702848
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Inefficient Markov perfect equilibria in multilateral bargaining
Cai, Hongbin - In: Economic Theory 22 (2003) 3, pp. 583-606
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005371063
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Bargaining with revoking costs
Dutta, Rohan - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 1, pp. 144-153
A simple two stage bilateral bargaining game is analyzed. The players simultaneously demand shares of a unit size pie. If the demands add up to more than one, the players simultaneously choose whether to stick to their demand or accept the otherʼs offer. While both parties sticking to their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049846
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Tough negotiations: Bilateral bargaining with durable commitments
Ellingsen, Tore; Miettinen, Topi - In: Games and Economic Behavior 87 (2014) C, pp. 353-366
attrition: Negotiators initially commit to incompatible offers, but agreement occurs once a negotiator's commitment decays. If …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931181
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Price discrimination through communication
Sher, Itai; Vohra, Rakesh - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 2
We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when a buyer may present evidence relevant to her value. We show that a condition very close to transparency of buyer segments is necessary and sufficient for the optimal mechanism to be deterministic--hence akin to classic third...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010777681