In this paper we incorporate tradable permits in a model of strategic environmental policy as an alternative policy scheme. In particular, we develop an international oligopoly model, where governments issue non-cooperatively a number of permits and then allow their trading by their polluting...

Governments use environmental policies, such as an emissions standard or a tax, to control pollution and for rent shifting purposes. Contrary to firms, however, governments are unable to perfectly foresee the actual level of demand and the cost of abatement. Our results suggest that not only the...

We construct a model of strategic environmental policy with flexible regulation in an international duopoly context. Firms can affect future environmental regulation through a prior investment in abatement. We demonstrate that the strategic use of environmental policy leads to lower welfare and...

In a recent paper, Creane and Miyagiwa (J Int Econ 75:229–244, <CitationRef CitationID="CR5">2008</CitationRef>) show that the mode of competition determines whether information sharing occurs between firms and governments within an international duopoly context in which the firms are located in different countries. In this paper, we...</citationref>