The present paper provides a model of coopetitive game for environmental sustainability of a global green economy, looking for a win-win solution within a complex construct of a type originally devised by Branderburger and Nalebuff. The model here suggested is environmental sustainable since it...

In the context of bilateral bargaining, we deal with issue linkage by developing a two-issue cooperative bargaining model. In contrast to the traditional Nash bargaining literature, the axioms we propose focus on the role of the disagreement points. We characterize a new solution that we call...

In the present work, agreement on allocation of payments from multiple issues requires unanimous consent of all parties involved. The agents are assumed to know the aggregate payoffs but do not know their decomposition by issues. This framework applies to many real-world problems, such as the...

While actual bargaining features many issues and decision making on the order in which issues are negotiated and resolved, the typical models of bargaining do not. Instead, they have either a single issue or many issues resolved in some fixed order, typically simultaneously. This paper shows...

In the present work, agreement on allocation of payments from multiple issues requires unanimous consent of all parties involved. The agents are assumed to know the aggregate payoffs but do not know their decomposition by issues. This framework applies to many real-world problems, such as the...

Reputation effects and other-regarding preferences have both been used to predict cooperative outcomes in markets with inefficient equilibria. Existing reputation-building models require either infinite time horizons or publicly observed identities, but cooperative outcomes have been observed in...

In a unified framework, we survey the recent literature on partnership dissolution with interdependent values. Contrary to the private-values case, where the main obstacle hindering the construction of efficient trading mechanisms is the asymmetry in initial endowments, we find that...

The comparative advantage has been studied from various perspectives, focusing solely on partial efforts such as labor force. Some researchers, such as Manoilescu, have attempted to establish a more rigorous theoretical model by observing total efforts. Moreover, the above-mentioned researcher...

When contracts are not enforceable, or property rights are not clearly defined, individuals may lack an incentive to carry out costly investments even when they are socially efficient. Some recent contributions such as Ellingsen and Robles (2002) prove that this problem may be less dramatic than...