Family firms are ubiquitous in most countries. The differences in objectives, governance, and management styles between those firms and their non-family counterparts have several implications for the workforce, which scholars have only recently started to investigate. Family firms offer greater...

This study analyzes the trade-off relationship between layoffs and wage cuts. If the introduction of a performance-based payment system stimulates workers’ pecuniarymotivated minds, their morale can be damaged more severely by wage cuts than prior to the introduction thereof. Utilizing this...

Employing data on publicly listed Indian manufacturing firms covering the period 1996-2012, we investigate the impact of the presence of banker-director on the board of family firms. We posit several hypotheses that highlight the pros and cons of the presence of banker-directors. The findings...

In this lecture I first give an explanation for invidious preferences based on the (evolutionary) competition for resources. Then I show that these preferences have wide ranging and empirically relevant effects on labor markets, such as: workplace skill segregation, gradual promotions, wage...

In this study, we examine whether the levels and structures of top executive compensation vary discernibly with different levels of board independence. We also examine how the newly mandated adoption of the remuneration committee (RC) in Taiwan affects the board independence-executive pay...

Der Bezug und die Höhe von Sonderzahlungen variieren stark mit individuellen undbetrieblichen Merkmalen sowie mit der Höhe des Stundenlohns. Große Unterschiedebestehen zwischen Frauen und Männern, zwischen Ost- und Westdeutschland sowie je nachBetriebsgröße und Branche. Im...

Using representative linked employer-employee data for Germany, this paper analyzes short- and long-run differences in labor market performance of workers joining start-ups instead of incumbent firms. Applying entropy balancing and following individuals over ten years, we find huge and...

Morse <italic>et al.</italic> (2011), henceforth MNS, interpret the data to suggest that more powerful CEOs <italic>ex post</italic> change their incentive contracts to put greater weight on performance measures that are ex-post more favorable. My paper points out a number of issues with their inference. First and most...

Agency theory suggests that high pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) of CEO's compensation is an important motivation mechanism to the CEO to improve corporate performance. We develop a simple model that suggests that reverse causality should also be considered. Specifically, our model predicts...