In a recent work, Dragone et al. (2010) modeled an optimal control model of pollution abatement, and investigated the adoption of a tax levied on the firm's instantaneous contribution to the accumulation of pollution. In this paper, we extend the work of Dragone et al. (2010) by providing a...

Firms can sometimes preempt regulation by changing the nature, scale or location of their activities. The objectives of this paper are to model such preemptive behavior and to draw out implications for regulatory design. Applications to New Source Review are emphasized. Regulatory triggers...

In 2013, Beladi et al. constructed a dynamic general equilibrium model of pollution, and characterized a steady-state equilibrium. In this paper, we extend Beladi et al.’s model to an even more general model in which the pollution abatement costs under learning by doing are taken into account....

We study the cost effectiveness property of different control strategies for improving environmental quality. Our prospective analysis considers the application of Transferable Emissions Permit System (TEPS), Transferable Ambient Permit System (TAPS) and Standards (Std) applied on fix sources in...

This paper measures the response of US-based multinationals to the Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA). Using a panel of firm-level data over the period 1966-1999, I estimate the effect of regulation on a multinational's foreign production decisions. The CAAA induced substantial variation in the...

In this paper, I develop a two-stage game of pollution abatement technology adoption in a Cournot oligopoly to investigate a firm's decision to adopt pollution abatement technology. In particular, I study the adoption incentives and welfare implications of popular environmental policies, namely...

This article analyzes the impact of market power on a transferable emissions permit system (TEPS). The application is carried out for the case of the "Programa de Compensación de Emisiones" in the city of Santiago, Chile, using data for 1997. In addition

This article analyzes the cost-effective property of a transferable emissions permit system (TEPS) vis à vis a command and control environmental regulation. In contrast with the previous literature, our analysis consider, in addition to the abatement costs, the cost of enforcing each regulatory...

In this paper, I develop a two-stage game of pollution abatement technology adoption in a Cournot oligopoly to investigate a firm's decision to adopt pollution abatement technology. In particular, I study the adoption incentives and welfare implications of popular environmental policies, namely...

Does improving creditor coordination by strengthening CACs lead to efficiency gains in the functioning of sovereign bond markets? We address this question in a model featuring both debtor moral hazard and creditor coordination under incomplete information. Conditional on default, we characterize...