The role and influence of the finance minister within the cabinet are discussed with increasing prominence in the theoretical literature on the political economy of budget deficits. It is generally assumed that the spending ministers can enhance their reputation purely with new or more extensive...

An adversarial game is used to model a firm's intrinsic and exerted influence over a regulator. Data from the World Business Environment Survey provide strong evidence in support of model hypotheses across a wide range of government agents, countries, and regulatory areas. Of particular...

We analyze electorally motivated public spending using disaggregated expenditure data. Election cycles in total expenditures and in specific sub-categories mainly exist in newly democratized Eastern European countries. However, electorally motivated spending policies are ineffective means to...

This article investigates the Multiple Equilibria Regulation (MER) model, i.e., an agent-based simulation model, to represent opinion dynamics in social networks. It relies on a small set of micro-prerequisites (intra-individual balance and confidence bound), leading to emergence of...

Benevolent governments lacking commitment ability provide too much insurance, if opportunistic private agents free ride on the government´s concern and exert too little effort expecting government assistance. Yet, the costs of implementing the transfer policy work as a commitment device,...

A tanulmány azt a kérdést vizsgálja, hogy az államba vetett bizalom hogyan befolyásolja a költségvetési egyensúly létrejöttét és fennmaradását. Fő tézise, hogy azokban az országokban, ahol alacsony a társadalomnak a politikai rendszerbe vetett bizalma, a költségvetés...

We present a dynamic theory of electoral competition to study the determinants of fiscal policy. In each period, two parties choose electoral platforms to maximize the expected number of elected representatives. The platforms include public expenditure, redistributive transfers, the tax rate and...

Why do rational politicians choose inefficient policy instruments? Environmental regulation, for example, often takes the form of technology standards and quotas even when cost-effective Pigou taxes are available. To shed light on this puzzle, we present a stochastic game with multiple...

We investigate empirically how electoral democracy and judicial independence relate to personal freedom. While judicial independence is positively and robustly related to personal freedom in all its forms, electoral democracy displays a robust, positive relationship with only two out of seven...

Robert Wilson und Paul Milgrom erhielten am 10. Dezember 2020 den Preis der Schwedischen Nationalbank für Wirtschaftswissenschaften zu Ehren von Alfred Nobel. Die Ökonomen erhielten den Preis für ihre Beiträge zur Auktionstheorie und für die Entwicklung neuer Auktionsformate.