We look at the basic applications of cooperative game theory to economic situations. These include bargaining and cooperative equilibria, especially as the number of players increases without bound. The core and the Shapley value are the fundamental tools for these applications. We consider the...

We study learning in a large class of complete information normal form games. Players continually face new strategic situations and must form beliefs by extrapolation from similar past situations. We characterize the long-run outcomes of learning in terms of iterated dominance in a related...

From a game-theoretic point of view, fraudulent accounting to embellish the financial status of a firm and the use of drugs to enhance performance in sports are very similar. We study the replicator dynamics of such games. We allow for heterogeneous populations, such as highly talented versus...

We consider a principal-multiagent framework with adverse selection when contracting is possible ex ante. However, enforcement of contracts is imperfect, which results in inefficiencies. We study how group contracting may or may not mitigate those inefficiencies.

In this paper signals are observed by two receivers who have different preferences about the sender and therefore respond to information about himin different ways. This can result in a Catch-22 for the sender; if he sends a signal to induce a positive response from one receiver, this may induce...

In an interactive model of offshore bidding, two firms located in two different countries bid on a project in a third country under exchange rate uncertainty. Every firm benefits and provides a higher bid when both firms have hedging opportunities. Even if only one bidder has the hedging...

In this paper, we develop a theoretical model of household production, bargaining and credit to analyse how access to microcredit affects intra-household decision-making and welfare, and identify conditions under which female household members are most likely to benefit. We show that, consistent...

We present an experimental game in the p-beauty framework. Building on the definitions of boundary and interior equilibria, we distinguish between ‘speed of convergence towards the game-theoretic equilibrium' and ‘deviations of the guesses from the game-theoretic equilibrium'. In contrast to...

In this paper we prove the impossibility of stability rules that satisfy a concept weaker than nonbossiness. Stability and nonbossiness are essential to matching theory. However, Kojima Fuhito(2010) shows that a matching mechanism that is both stable and nonbossy dose not exist. We define a new...