We study a non-cooperative model of unilateral network formation. Derks et al. [2008b] prove the existence of local-Nash and global-Nash networks for games with payoff functions that satisfy a framework of axiomatic properties. These properties are inspired by the one-way flow model, which is...

In this paper we propose an extension of the core of NTU games from its domain to a larger set of games satisfying a few conditions of well-behavedness. The solution concept is a rather straightforward generalization of the extended core of TU games introduced by Gomez [2003] and is shown to...

A group of agents have claims on a resource, but there is not enough of the resource to honor all of the claims. How should it be divided? We survey the recent game theoretic approaches that have been followed in solving such "claims problems".

We show that the Owen value for TU games with a cooperation structure extends the Shapley value in a consistent way. In particular, the Shapley value is the expected Owen value for all symmetric distributions on the partitions of the player set. Similar extensions of the Banzhaf value do not...

In the paper two-person nonzero-sum semi-infinite games with bounded payoffs are studied — both with countable and uncountable infinite strategy space. Under some concavity/convexity assumptions they are shown to possess ε-equilibria (equilibria) in strategies with supports consisting of at...

This survey deals with two-sided matching markets where one set of agents (workers/residents) has to be matched with another set of agents (firms/hospitals). We first give a short overview of a selection of classical results. Then, we review recent contributions to a complex and representative...

Considered here is direct exchange of production allowances or input factors. Motivated by practical modeling and compution, we suppose every owner or user of such items has a linear technology. The issue is whether competitive market equilibrium can be reached merely via iterated bilateral...

The fertile application of cooperative game techniques to cost sharing problems on networks has so far concentrated on the Stand Alone core test of fairness and/or stability, and ignored many combinatorial optimization problems where this core can be empty. I submit there is much room for an...