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Prudent rationalizability in generalized extensive-form games with unawareness

Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard - In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics 21 (2021) 2, pp. 525-556

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012593900

Strategic reasoning in persuasion games : an experiment

Li, Ying Xue; Schipper, Burkhard - In: Games and economic behavior 121 (2020), pp. 329-367

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012430288

Universal type structures with unawareness

Heinsalu, Sander - In: Games and Economic Behavior 83 (2014) C, pp. 255-266

Infinite hierarchies of awareness and beliefs arise in games with unawareness, similarly to belief hierarchies in … structure with unawareness where each type has an awareness level and a belief over types. Countable hierarchies are therefore … sufficient to describe all uncertainty in games with unawareness. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049778

Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior

Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard C. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 81 (2013) C, pp. 50-68

We define generalized extensive-form games which allow for asymmetric awareness of actions. We extend Pearceʼs (1984) notion of extensive-form (correlated) rationalizability to this setting, explore its properties, and prove existence.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049860

Strategic gaze: an interactive eye-tracking study

Hausfeld, J.; von Hesler, K.; Goldlücke, S. - In: Experimental Economics 24 (2020) 1, pp. 177-205

We present an interactive eye-tracking study that explores the strategic use of gaze. We analyze gaze behavior in an experiment with four simple games. The game can either be a competitive (hide & seek) game in which players want to be unpredictable, or a game of common interest in which players...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014503691

Informative tests in signaling environments

Weksler, Ran; Zik, Boaz - In: Theoretical Economics 17 (2022) 3, pp. 977-1006

We study a receiver's learning problem of choosing an informative test in a signaling environment. Each test induces a signaling subgame. Thus, in addition to its direct effect on the receiver's information, a test has an indirect effect through the sender's signaling strategy. We show that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536864

Data and incentives

Liang, Annie; Madsen, Erik - In: Theoretical Economics 19 (2024) 1, pp. 407-448

``Big data" gives markets access to previously unmeasured characteristics of individual agents. Policymakers must decide whether and how to regulate the use of this data. We study how new data affects incentives for agents to exert effort in settings such as the labor market, where an agent's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536868

Paying with information

Kaya, Ayça - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 2, pp. 669-706

The founder of a start-up (principal) who has a project with uncertain returns must retain and incentivize an agent using promise of future payments and information gathering. The agent's effort incrementally advances production and such advance is a prerequisite for gathering new information....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536898

Optimal persuasion via bi-pooling

Arieli, Itai; Babichenko, Yakov; Smorodinsky, Rann; … - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 1, pp. 15-36

Mean-preserving contractions are critical for studying Bayesian models of information design. We introduce the class of bi-pooling policies, and the class of bi-pooling distributions as their induced distributions over posteriors. We show that every extreme point in the set of all...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536904

Quid pro quo: friendly information exchange between rivals

Blume, Andreas; Park, In-Uck - In: Theoretical Economics 17 (2022) 3, pp. 1183-1223

We show that information exchange via disclosure is possible in equilibrium even when it is certain that whenever one … party learns the truth, the other loses. The incentive to disclose results either from an expectation of disclosure being … disclosure -- the screening motive. Alternating and gradual disclosures are generally indispensable for information exchange and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536985