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Prudent rationalizability in generalized extensive-form games with unawareness

Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard - In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics 21 (2021) 2, pp. 525-556

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012593900

Strategic reasoning in persuasion games : an experiment

Li, Ying Xue; Schipper, Burkhard - In: Games and economic behavior 121 (2020), pp. 329-367

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012430288

Universal type structures with unawareness

Heinsalu, Sander - In: Games and Economic Behavior 83 (2014) C, pp. 255-266

Infinite hierarchies of awareness and beliefs arise in games with unawareness, similarly to belief hierarchies in … structure with unawareness where each type has an awareness level and a belief over types. Countable hierarchies are therefore … sufficient to describe all uncertainty in games with unawareness. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049778

Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior

Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard C. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 81 (2013) C, pp. 50-68

We define generalized extensive-form games which allow for asymmetric awareness of actions. We extend Pearceʼs (1984) notion of extensive-form (correlated) rationalizability to this setting, explore its properties, and prove existence.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049860

Regret testing: learning to play Nash equilibrium without knowing you have an opponent

Foster, Dean P.; Young, H. Peyton - In: Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 3, pp. 341-367

A learning rule is uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent's payoffs. It is radically uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent's actions or payoffs. We demonstrate a family of simple, radically uncoupled learning rules whose...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599374

Noisy talk

Blume, Andreas; Board, Oliver J.; Kawamura, Kohei - In: Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) 4, pp. 395-440

We investigate strategic information transmission with communication error, or noise. Our main finding is that adding noise can improve welfare. With quadratic preferences and a uniform type distribution, welfare can be raised for almost every bias level by introducing a sufficiently small...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599393

Multi-sender cheap talk with restricted state spaces

Ambrus, Attila; Takahashi, Satoru - In: Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) 1, pp. 1-27

This paper analyzes multi-sender cheap talk when the state space might be restricted, either because the policy space is restricted, or the set of rationalizable policies of the receiver is not the whole space. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a fully...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599396

Supermodular mechanism design

Mathevet, Laurent A. - In: Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) 3, pp. 403-443

This paper introduces a mechanism design approach that allows dealing with the multiple equilibrium problem, using mechanisms that are robust to bounded rationality. This approach is a tool for constructing supermodular mechanisms, i.e. mechanisms that induce games with strategic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599433

Optimal deadlines for agreements

Damiano, Ettore; Li, Hao; Suen, Wing - In: Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) 2, pp. 357-393

Costly delay in negotiations can induce the negotiating parties to be more forthcoming with their information and improve the quality of the collective decision. Imposing a deadline may result in stalling, in which players at some point stop making concessions but switch back to conceding at the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599465

A principal-agent model of sequential testing

Gerardi, Dino; Maestri, Lucas - In: Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) 3, pp. 425-463

This paper analyzes the optimal provision of incentives in a dynamic information acquisition process. In every period, the agent can acquire costly information that is relevant to the principal's decision. Each signal may or may not provide definitive evidence in favor of the good state. Neither...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599467

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