This paper considers pure strategy Nash equilibria of non-cooperative legislative bargaining models. In contrast to existing legislative bargaining models, we derive legislators behavior from stochastic utility maximization. This approach allows us to prove the existence of a stationary Pure...

This paper investigates the role of structural imbalance between job seekers and job openings for the forecasting performance of a labour market matching function. Starting from a Cobb-Douglas matching function with constant returns to scale (CRS) in each frictional micro market shows that on...

The Nash program is an important research agenda initiated in Nash (Econometrica 21:128-140, 1953) in order to bridge the gap between the noncooperative and cooperative counterparts of game theory. The program is thus turning sixty-seven years old, but I will argue it is not ready for...

We generalize the disutility of effort function in the linear-Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) puremoral hazardmodel.We assume that agents are heterogeneous in ability. Each agent's ability is observable and treated as a parameter that indexes the disutility of effort associated with the...

The theory of incentives and matching theory can complement each other. In particular, matching theory can be a tool for analyzing optimal incentive contracts within a general equilibrium framework. We propose several models that study the endogenous payoffs of principals and agents as a...

In this article we combine Debreu’s (Proc Natl Acad Sci 38(10):886–893, 1952) social system with Hurwicz’s (Econ Design 1(1):1–14, 1994; Am Econ Rev 98(3):577–585, 2008) ideas of embedding a “desired” game form into a “natural” game form that includes all feasible behavior, even if...

We propose an elementary theory of wars fought by fully rational contenders that features three of the main rationalist explanations for armed conflicts: uncertainty, commitment, and indivisibility. Two parties play a Markov game that combines stages of bargaining, where offers are made, with...

Strategische Lehren der Maastricht-Kriterien Die Fiskalkriterien des Maastrichter Vertrags sind in der ökonomischen Analyse heftig kritisiert worden. Ein Teil dieser Kritik basiert möglicherweise auf einem zu engen ökonomischen Ansatz, der die strategische Funktion der Kriterien übersieht....

Several structural results for the set of competitive equilibria in trading networks with frictions are established: The lattice theorem, the rural hospitals theorem, the existence of side-optimal equilibria, and a group-incentive-compatibility result hold with imperfectly transferable utility...