This paper presents a strategic model of risk-taking behavior in contests. Formally, we analyze an n-player winner-take-all contest in which each player decides when to stop a privately observed Brownian motion with drift. A player whose process reaches zero has to stop. The player with the...

This paper proposes an extension of the valuation equilibrium concept (Jehiel and Samet, 2007), which partly endogenises the underlying grouping of actions. The effect on equilibrium predictions is illustrated in a burning money game.

We consider a two-player all-pay auction with symmetric independent private values that are uniformly distributed. The designer chooses the size of a head start that is given to one of the players. The designer’s objective is to maximize a convex combination of the expected highest effort and...

This note analyzes a two-player all-pay auction with incomplete information. More precisely, one bidder is uncertain about the size of the initial advantage of his rival modeled as a head start in the auction.

We consider a two-player contest model in which breakthroughs arrive according to privately observed Poisson processes. Each player’s process continues as long as she exerts costly effort. The player who collects the most breakthroughs until a predetermined deadline wins a prize.

Most MDA approaches are focused on Platform Independent Models (PIM) and Platform Specific Models (PSM) and the transformation between them. The more conceptual Computation Independent Models (CIM) or even unstructured information is often neglected, despite the importance of requirements...